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Abstract: I provide a positive expressivist account of the permissibility of ‘standing one’s ground’ in some 
cases of moral conflict, based in part on an illustrative analogy with political disputes. This account 
suffices to undermine Enoch’s recent argument against expressivism. 
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Can expressivists accommodate common-sense views about permissible and impermissible ways of 
proceeding in moral debate? Enoch argues that they cannot.
1
 This objection is welcome insofar as it 
involves refreshing levels of detail about the mechanisms of moral disagreement, thus eschewing a 
far-too-common tendency for meta-ethicists to describe moral practice in excessively abstract 
terms. Nevertheless, I shall argue that the objection fails. But the manner of this failure is 
illuminating. First, it helps emphasise the difference, on the expressivist view, between moral 
attitudes and mere preferences. Second, it highlights a potentially fruitful analogy between moral 
and political disagreement.  
 
1. Enoch’s Argument 
 
According to Enoch, expressivism implies that certain ways of proceeding in moral debate – viz. 
                                                 
1
 Enoch 2011: 16-49. Subsequent numbers in brackets are references to this book.  
  
‘standing one’s ground’ (17) – are not permitted, when intuitively they (sometimes) are. Insofar as 
one desideratum in meta-ethics is to ‘save the appearances’ of moral practice, such revisionism 
counts as a serious loss of ‘plausibility points’ (14).  
 
Enoch’s argument concerns cases of 'interpersonal conflict' (16), that is, conflict concerning 
the best way of proceeding in cases where distinct agents need (in some loose sense) to agree on a 
joint course of action. In such cases, at least two incompatible courses of joint action are available, 
with different agents preferring distinct courses. Some such conflicts are based on ‘mere 
preferences’. Consider: 
 
Anyone for Tennnis? We're spending the afternoon together. I want to catch a movie I've 
been looking forward to seeing. You'd rather play tennis. But both of us really want to 
spend the afternoon together. (17, my label.) 
 
Here there are at least two ways of proceeding. First, impartially. This involves adopting a decision-
procedure which counts each of our preferences equally, e.g. tossing a fair coin. Second, one or both 
of us could adopt a particular type of partial behaviour, viz. that of 'standing our ground' and 
'insisting' that our own preference be satisfied (17). 
 
 Enoch's refreshingly detailed premise concerns the type of conflict resolution appropriate for 
cases of interpersonal conflict based on disagreement in moral judgements (call these ‘moral 
conflicts’). Consider: 
 
Experiment. Suppose that I believe that there is nothing wrong in causing animals (say, 
dogs) serious pain....You, on the other hand, believe that there is something morally 
wrong in subjecting dogs to serious pain. And suppose we find ourselves in the kind of 
  
situation where...we need to decide about a joint course of action, with one alternative 
causing serious pain to dogs, and the other involving no such thing. (23, my label.) 
 
In such cases, Enoch claims, it is permissible for at least one agent (you) to stand their ground and 
insist that the course of action followed is the one that is recommended by their moral belief (23).  
 
The permissibility of proceeding partially by standing one's ground in such cases depends, 
according to Enoch, on two conditions being met. First, that the mere fact one finds oneself in 
dispute with another judger does not undermine the justification for one’s conflict-grounding 
judgement. Second, that no ‘seriously problematic consequences’ will follow from standing one’s 
ground. These conditions define what Enoch calls conflict cases ‘of the relevant kind’ (25) and all 
of what follows should by understood as implicitly restricted to such cases.
2
  
 
Given this terminology, Enoch's argument against expressivism proceeds as follows (35-38): 
 
(1) If expressivism is true then in moral conflicts it is not permissible to stand one's ground. 
 
(2) In moral conflicts it is permissible to stand one's ground (26). 
 
Therefore 
 
(3) Expressivism is false. 
 
The argument is valid, so attention turns to the premises. 
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 In cases where these conditions are not met, the relevant version of premise (2) in Enoch’s argument (as set out below) 
is implausible.  
  
Begin with (2). This premise is understood by Enoch to be an existentially quantified 
proposition, stating merely that in some moral conflicts, someone standing their ground is 
permissible (26). Enoch supports this premise by reflecting on Experiment, where 
 
…it seems intuitively clear that you are justified in standing your ground, making sure 
that we don't proceed in the way that will subject the dog to serious pain. (23) 
 
I share Enoch’s intuition and thus accept (2).  
   
That leaves (1). Given the understanding of (2), to secure validity this must be understood as 
the claim that if expressivism is true it is never permissible to stand one’s ground (in the relevant 
cases). Enoch does not define expressivism explicitly, but it is common enough to take it as the 
view that moral judgements express a particular type of non-cognitive attitude rather than moral 
beliefs. Like Enoch, I take Blackburn (1984; 1998) to be a paradigm expressivist. 
 
2. First Argument for (1) 
 
Why accept (1)? One of Enoch’s arguments proceeds via a comparison with conflict cases based on 
mere preference, such as Anyone for Tennis? It runs as follows:  
 
(1a) In cases of interpersonal conflict based on mere preference it is not permissible to stand 
one’s ground (19, my wording).  
 
(1b) If expressivism is true then moral conflicts just are cases of interpersonalconflict based 
on mere preference.
3
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 This premise is not explicitly stated by Enoch. But it follows from two claims he does make. First, that a structurally 
similar claim is true of ‘Caricaturized Subjectivism’ (25). Second that the argument presented against Caricaturized 
  
 
Hence 
 
(1) If expressivism is true, then in moral conflicts it is not permissible to stand one’s ground.  
 
Again the validity of the argument shifts attention to the premises.  
 
Why accept (1a)? According to Enoch, to deny (1a) is to think that my preferences are more 
important just because they are mine. Further, there are niggling Nagelian doubts that this latter 
claim expresses an unpalatable normative truth: the normative relevance of preferences cannot 
depend on such non-universalizable features (18, cf. Nagel 1986). 
 
That leaves (1b). As Enoch notes (31-32, 38), this premise is vulnerable because the 
expressivist can claim that the non-cognitive attitudes expressed by moral judgements are 
importantly different from the preferences involved in cases such as Anyone for Tennis? – different 
enough so that disagreements involving the former do permit some agents to stand their ground. 
How damaging is this vulnerability? Not very, according to Enoch. This is because although 
drawing this distinction is in principle available to the expressivist, it is not obvious that there is an 
independent motivation for doing so (32-33).  According to Enoch, to distinguish between moral 
attitudes and mere preferences in this way is just to hold that moral attitudes are ‘normatively 
special’ – special in precisely the sense that generates the conclusion that it is sometimes 
permissible to stand one’s ground by them (31). But in the dialectical context this is unsatisfactory 
because it ad-hoc-ly posits one normative truth merely to explain another. As Enoch puts it: ‘In 
order to avoid normatively problematic consequences, [the expressivist] explicitly introduces the 
normative input needed to get the right normative input. But he has nothing to give by way of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Subjectivism generalizes to the expressivist case (16, 27). Similar remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to (1).   
  
rationale for this normative input. We know all along, after all, that there was this normative 
difference. The question is why there is such a difference. And here the [expressivist] just has no 
answer’ (32-33).4 
 
This defence of (1b) fails because the expressivist is not committed to the view that there is 
(purely) a normative difference between moral attitudes and mere preferences, rather she can and 
does claim that there is a psychological difference between these two types of state. This same 
difference is enough to show that (1b) is false. Elucidating and defending this difference is best left 
until §4, when there will be further cause to examine the expressivist account of moral attitudes.    
 
3. Second Argument for (1) 
 
The second argument for (1) relies on the claim that if expressivism is true then moral truths are in 
some sense dependent on our responses. Enoch revs up:  ‘the expressivist...has to believe that 
morality depends on us, that the ultimate explanation of why it is that certain moral claims are true 
has something to do with our feelings and attitudes’ (36). Swerving the sticky issue of the 
expressivist understanding of counterfactuals that might encapsulate this dependence, Enoch cites 
Blackburn's claim that ‘the [expressivist] holds that our nature as moralists is well-explained by 
regarding us as reacting to a reality which contains nothing in the way of values, duties, rights and 
so forth’. Moving through the gears, Enoch continues: ‘Arguably, this explanatory priority of 
our...emotions and reactions over the normative truths and facts...suffices to show that 
[expressivism] is committed to a contingency (of moral truths) of the kind Blackburn is eager to 
avoid’ (37). And reaching full throttle Enoch states the second argument: ‘If what explains certain 
moral truths is something about my emotions or reactions, and if my emotions are prima facie just 
as important as those of others, then it must be wrong to just stand one's ground in cases of conflict 
                                                 
4
 Note that the text here is part of an argument against response-dependent views of morality, but Enoch is explicit that 
the same reasoning applies to expressivism (38).  
  
(of the relevant kind) due to disagreement’ (37). Here's the argument bit-by-bit: 
 
(1c) If expressivism is true then what explains certain moral truths is something about my 
emotions or reactions.  
 
(1d) My emotions and reactions are prima facie just as important as others’ emotions and 
reactions. 
 
(1e) If what explains moral truths is something about my emotions or reactions and if my 
emotions and reactions are prima facie just as important as others’ emotions and reactions 
then in moral conflicts it is not permissible to stand one’s ground.  
 
Hence 
 
(1) If expressivism is true then in moral conflicts it is not permissible to stand one’s ground.  
 
This argument fails because (1c) is false. To see this, it is necessary to distinguish two 
explananda which Enoch runs together: moral judgements (such as my judgement that eating meat 
is permissible) and moral truths (such as the truth that cruelty is wrong). According to expressivism, 
in order to explain the first, all that is required is a naturalistic view of the world as containing 
natural properties, agents and their responses. As Blackburn puts it: ‘The only things in this world 
are the attitudes of people and those, of course, are trivially and harmlessly mind-dependent’ (1993: 
174). But expressivists explicitly deny that the second explananda – moral truths – are explained by 
(or dependent upon) our emotions or reactions in the same way. Blackburn again: 
 
It is because of our responses that we say that cruelty is wrong, but it is not because of 
  
them that it is so…our actual responses are inappropriate anchors for the wrongness of 
cruelty. What makes cruelty abhorrent is not that it offends us, but all those hideous 
things that make it so. (1993: 172; cf. 1984: 217 and 1998: 296.) 
 
Of course, Enoch might reply, it is one thing for an expressivist to say such things, another to 
show that doing so is consistent with expressivism. Enoch’s underlying suspicion is that the 
explanatory priority expressivism gives to our emotions and reactions when explaining moral 
judgement suffices to show expressivism to be committed to the same explanatory priority when it 
comes to explaining moral truths.
5
 To rebut this suspicion, the expressivist needs show how she can 
assert the claim: ‘What explains moral truths is not something about my emotions and reactions’ 
whilst still committing to expressivism. In so doing, she will show how one can accept the 
antecedent but not the consequent of (1c). 
 
 That the expressivist can assert such claims is not news. The standard account has three 
steps (see Blackburn 1981: 179-80; 1993: 4, 172-8; 1984: 218-9; Sinclair 2008). First, the relevant 
claim of explanation or dependency is stripped of any supposed metaethical (specifically, realist) 
commitments. So rather than understanding the claim here as the view that there are robust moral 
properties (such as the realist believes in) whose distribution is not explained by our reactive 
tendencies, we understand it as the claim that the correct application of (attitude-expressing) moral 
predicates is not explained by (dependent upon) our reactive tendencies. Second, such claims are 
given an ‘internal reading’, that is, they are understood as substantive moral positions. In this case, 
we understand the claim as stating that the correct application of moral predicates should not be 
taken to be explained by (depend upon) our reactive tendencies. Third and finally, the expressivist 
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moralists’. In cases of interpretative tension such as this, it seems reasonable to place less weight on multiply-
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‘stands with the righteous’ and asserts this moral claim.6   
 
So understood the expressivist can consistently hold that it is not the case that what explains 
moral truths is something about my (or anyone else’s) emotions or reactions. Thus (1c) is false and 
the second argument fails.  
 
4. Against (1) 
 
Enoch’s arguments therefore fail to support (1). There is also positive reason to think that (1) is 
false. This reason is provided by the availability of an expressivist explanation (that is, an 
explanation that includes some of the claims of expressivism in the explanans) of the sometime 
permissibility of standing one’s ground in moral conflict.  
 
 To begin, compare the realist explanation. As Enoch notes, the realist can explain the 
permissibility of standing one’s ground in the relevant cases by citing a (response-independent) 
realist truth which matters to the resolution of the dispute (32). Since the expressivist cannot appeal 
to such a truth, it might seem that she lacks the explanatory resources available to realism, again 
leading to a loss of plausibility points. But, I shall argue, a rival expressivist explanation is 
available. Providing it also delivers on the earlier promise to distinguish between moral attitudes 
and mere preferences.  
 
I will present the expressivist explanation in two stages. First I distinguish a type of 
interpersonal conflict, based on what I call serious negotiating concerns, where standing one’s 
ground is sometimes permitted (for non-realist reasons). Second, I show that expressivists can hold 
that some moral conflicts are relevantly similar to these types of conflict.  
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 In addition to offering this ‘internal reading’ of claims about the grounds of moral truth, expressivists typically argue 
that no non-question-begging ‘external reading’ is possible. ‘Talk of dependency is moral talk or nothing’ 
(Blackburn 1993: 173). 
  
 
First Stage: In some cases of interpersonal conflict based on serious negotiating concerns, standing 
one’s ground is permitted. 
 
What is a serious negotiating concern? It is, first, a concern, that is, it is a motivationally-infused 
non-cognitive attitude that disposes an agent to favour certain courses of action over others. An 
example would an environmentalist concern for the preservation of wilderness areas. Second a 
serious negotiating concern is serious. A serious concern is (i) reflectively endorsed, (ii) one about 
which the agent is resistant to change and (iii) one the satisfaction and preservation of which is 
considered by the agent to be very important (measuring importance psychologically, in terms of 
motivational strength and pervasiveness within the agent’s motivational profile). For some 
environmentalists, the concern to preserve wilderness is serious in this way. Finally, a serious 
negotiating concern is a negotiating stance, that is, one which one hopes will be shared by others, 
and which is partly constituted by a disposition to engage with others in ways which (one hopes) 
will lead to them sharing it. Again, the environmentalist concern is a good example.   
  
Given this definition, it is plausible to argue that, in some cases of interpersonal conflict 
based on serious negotiating concerns, it is permissible for one or both parties to stand their ground.  
 
Here’s why. When agents clash practically and their conflict is based on serious negotiating 
concerns, there is much at stake. Each agent is putting forward their concern as a potential shared 
public policy. Each concern is reflectively endorsed, stable and motivationally important for the 
agent. By definition, therefore, agents will not give up their serious negotiating concerns lightly. 
Having one’s serious negotiating concerns respected by others will be an important part of what an 
agent considers to be important in life. Given this (psychological) importance, it is plausible to say 
that agents are (at least in some cases) permitted to stand their ground and insist on the path 
  
mandated by their own concern. This last is a moral claim, of course, but it is a claim which seems 
plausible in the context of (at least some) deeply held concerns. To put the point another way: 
Agents are not required to sacrifice their deeply held negotiating concerns to the altar of an 
impartial decision-procedure (such as a coin toss) purely because they come into conflict with other 
agents. Serious negotiating concerns are too important to put aside in this way, and the 
permissibility of standing by them (in some cases) is dependent on this deep psychological 
importance. (This last is, of course, a claim of moral dependence, given an ‘internal reading’.) 
 
Does this argument fall foul of the Nagelian point that by admitting the permissibility of 
standing one’s ground here one is implicitly, and falsely, accepting that one’s own concern is more 
important simply by being one’s own? No. One is accepting that one’s concern is important (to one), 
and that important concerns should not be set aside lightly (ceteris paribus). One can accept the 
same thing about one’s disputant: they also have a concern that is very important (to them) and 
important concerns should not be set aside lightly. So to think standing one’s ground is permissible 
in such cases need not involve the Nagelian mistake.  
 
To further support this stage of the explanation, consider: 
 
Cry Me a River.  Two nations, bordered by a river, lay claim to a disputed eyot. For 
both, the eyot is crucially important in narratives of national identity and culture. The 
nations need to decide which of them will have sovereignty over the eyot.
7
  
 
In this case, suppose that there is no tie-breaking realist truth concerning which nation has better 
claim to the eyot, so no realist justification for either nation standing their ground. But there is still 
justification for (both) to stand their ground based on the cultural and social importance of the eyot 
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 My inspiration is the Nina Simone version of the song of the same name. Though the term ‘eyot’ is most commonly 
used to refer to islets in the River Thames, it is not restricted to that context. 
  
to them. When a concern is important in this way, it is permissible for nations not to sacrifice it by 
submitting to an impartial decision-procedure (ceteris paribus). To be prepared to make such a 
sacrifice would undermine each nation’s professed view of the eyot’s importance. Furthermore, 
standing one’s ground may be further justified in this case, if by so doing one party can extend the 
dispute until such a time as new, more mutually agreeable solutions present themselves. (Recall that 
the sort of cases we are concerned with involve no ‘seriously problematic consequences’ of standing 
one’s ground.) For example contemporary international law may not allow for joint sovereignty 
over territories, but it may be possible, over time, to successfully lobby for change. If so, both 
parties standing their ground and prolonging the dispute seems to be justified as a step towards a 
more constructive solution.  
 
Second Stage: Expressivists can accept that some cases of moral conflicts are relevantly similar to 
such conflicts. 
 
The second stage has two parts. The first is to show that, according to expressivism, moral attitudes 
are sometimes very similar to (if not identical with) serious negotiating concerns. This is borne out 
by the claims of actual expressivists. First, expressivists hold that moral attitudes are concerns. That 
is, they are non-cognitive attitudes that dispose agents to favour certain courses of action over 
others (Blackburn 1984: 181; 1998: 48-51). Second, they are sometimes serious. As Blackburn puts 
it: 
 
…when values are involved, we typically resist anything likely to destabilise them. 
Such processes would be regarded as undermining and threatening. So, if we imagine 
the general field of an agent’s concerns, his or her values might be regarded as those 
concerns that he is also concerned preserve: the ones by which he stands. He would 
contemplate losing them only with dismay…To hold a value…is typically to have a 
  
relatively stable disposition to conduct practical life and practical discussion in a 
particular way, it is to be disposed or set in that way, and notably to be set against 
change in this respect. (1998: 67) 
 
Third, they are negotiating, that is they are concerns we would prefer others to share. As Blackburn 
puts it, they are ‘emotionally ascended’ concerns, that is directed not just at particular actions, but at 
others’ responses (positive and negative) to those actions, and at responses to those responses, and 
so on (1998: 8-9).
8
 It thus seems not unreasonable to interpret some expressivists as holding that 
moral attitudes are sometimes very similar to (even identical with) serious negotiating concerns.  
 
The second part of this stage of the explanation is to show that, according to such versions 
of expressivism, some moral conflicts are relevantly similar to the type of conflict based on serious 
negotiating concerns where ground-standing is permissible. This is easy to do. In Cry Me a River 
what made ground-standing permissible was the fact that the dispute-grounding concerns were 
serious and negotiating (and perhaps also the fact that ground-standing may be a good way to a 
constructive solution). These conditions will often hold in moral disputes, understood on the 
expressivist model. For example, in Experiment the conflict may reflect serious negotiating 
concerns; concerns that both parties are (seriously) concerned to preserve. If so, and given the 
general moral truth that agents should not give up deeply held concerns lightly, it will be 
permissible for both parties to stand their ground. Further, it may be the case that the protracted 
impasse brought on by such ground-standing would give rise to better solutions to the conflict (a 
pain-free experiment-design, perhaps). If so, this is additional reason to think that standing one’s 
ground here is permitted, even given an expressivist understanding of the conflict. 
  
5. Conclusion 
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 These three features of moral attitudes roughly correspond to the features of aversion, personal level acceptance and 
social hostility distinguished in Björnsson and McPherson (forthcoming).  
  
 
If the above arguments are correct. Enoch’s argument against expressivism fails. It fails because it is   
not true that expressivism entails that in moral conflicts standing one’s ground is never permissible. 
It fails, further, because expressivists can explain (just as much as the realist) why standing one’s 
ground is sometimes permissible. This explanation employs a claim about the relative psychological 
importance of the concerns typically expressed by moral judgements, a claim which follows from 
common expressivist accounts of the nature of moral attitudes. The availability of this explanation 
highlights two important features of expressivism. First the distinction drawn between typical moral 
attitudes and mere preferences. Second, the possibility of an illuminating analogy between 
expressively-understood moral disputes and political disputes, such as Cry me a River. The latter in 
particular is a much under-explored strategy for the development of expressivism.
9
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